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 The ‘Mali crisis’ denotes a complex series of linked events and dynam-
ics that Mali has undergone since 2012.  Regional actors and dynamics 
have played important roles both in underpinning the crisis, and in 
current efforts to resolve that crisis and return the country to peace and 
stability. This paper examines the Mali crisis through a regional lens – 
first in terms of understanding two most proximate drivers of the crisis, 
the rebellion of the Tuaregs combined with Islamic extremism in the 
north of the country. The Tuareg are a minority group in the north of 
Mali whose few opportunities for livelihoods in the north include re-
gional trade and trafficking of contraband. The Tuareg’s mounting dis-
satisfaction with governance from Bamako was given added force by 
the return of well-armed and radicalised Tuareg from Libya following 
the fall of the Gadaffi regime in August 2011. The combined effects of 
disaffected and radicalised Tuareg rebel groups one the one hand, and 
Islamic militant groups, notably those emerging from the Algerian con-
flict of the 1990s, set off the recent crisis in Mali. The paper then exam-
ines how the key African multilateral actors – ECOWAS at sub-regional 
level, the AU at the continental level – responded to the ongoing crisis. 
The paper suggests that although several significant factors and dy-
namics that have influenced or even driven the Mali crisis were region-
al in scope, regional efforts to establish peace and stability in Mali have 
been too narrowly defined or flawed in attempted implementation. It 
suggests that resolving the problems in Mali must take into account the 
complex cross-border dynamics and drivers of conflict occurring within 
the broader regional, i.e. Sahelo-Sahrien, context.  
Tuareg rebellion and Islamic extremism 
The beginning of the contemporary crisis in Mali is widely pegged to 
January 2012 when Tuareg rebels belonging to the Movement national 
pour la libération d’Azawad (MNLA) launched attacks on several cities 
in the north of the country. The Tuareg rebellion was the fourth since 
Mali’s independence from France in 1960. The Tuaregs are semi-
nomadic Berbers who live in the Sahel and Sahara regions. They are 
spread across the states of Mali, Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya 
as a result of the international boundaries that emerged from the de-
colonisation of French West Africa in 1960. The lifestyle and necessary 
means of survival of Mali’s Tuareg are inextricably linked to interre-
gional trade that often crosses state boundaries. Mali’s Tuareg and 
Moor population have been estimated to comprise one-tenth of the 
population of the country.1 Other groups in Mali’s north include the 
Songhay, which are the largest ethnic group, the Peul, and Fulani eth-
nic groups, and Arab tribes. The repeated Tuareg rebellions in Mali 
                                                          
1  See discussion on challenges of establishing reliable figures on Mali’s ethnic 
makeup in Bruce Whitehouse, ‘Understanding Mali’s “Tuareg problem”’, Bridges 
from Bamako blog, 25 February 2013, 
http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/25/understanding-malis-tuareg-
problem/, accessed 30 April 2015.  
  
 
have largely involved Tuareg from the Kidal region, and have resulted 
from long-running governance problems and unresolved grievances, 
including marginalisation of the north and its people, the repeated 
failure of Bamako to give substance to promises of decentralisation, 
including funding to local authorities, and the entrenchment of clien-
telistic practices.2 These are grievances that have not been satisfied 
since independence in 1960.  
Northern Mali is marked by extreme poverty and few viable liveli-
hoods. One of the few means of livelihood is linked to trade, and in-
creasingly, the smuggling of contraband (cigarettes, weapons, irregular 
migrants and drugs). The desert environment in which the Tuareg and 
Arab tribes live is one where movement, widespread networks of sup-
port and interaction are critical elements of survival and of daily life.3 
Trade and criminal networks in the north of Mali extend over borders, 
not only to neighbouring Sahelien states, but further afield into North 
Africa. This regional political economy of smuggling is, in the view of 
one noted regional expert, more Saharan in its essence than Sahlien.4  
Moreover, climate change has rendered the north an even more in-
hospitable and conflict-prone environment; a reduction of Mali’s aver-
age rainfall by 30% since 1998 and the more frequent occurrence of 
droughts have resulted in high rates of chronic hunger. The Sahara 
desert is expanding by 48km per year, reducing grazing land and forc-
ing communities to migrate into areas that are already occupied by 
other groups, creating further reasons for inter-communal conflict. Wa-
ter shortages have long been a problem, and are a factor underpinning 
insecurity and political conflict. Some scholars link the droughts of the 
1970s and 1980s to the decimation of the Tuareg’s herds, which in 
recent years drove many to flee to Libya and seek employment in the 
Libyan security forces.5  
The 2012 rebellion differed from previous ones in large part because 
the regional context had changed, with a stronger AQMI presence in 
the north, the fall of the Gadaffi regime, and the establishment of lucra-
tive trade and smuggling routes that brought financial benefits to both 
traditional chiefs and rebel and Islamist militant groups. While dissat-
isfaction had been building among the Tuareg, with occasional attacks 
by the MNLA against the Malian army in the north in late 2011, the 
                                                          
2  Susanna D. Wing, ‘A New Hope for Peace, but Old Challenges Remain in Mali’, IPI 
Global Observatory, 10 March 2015.  
3  Judith Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 14.  
4  Wolfram Lacher, ‘The Malian crisis and the challenge of regional security coopera-
tion’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(2013), p. 1.  
5  Chris Arsenault, ‘Climate change, food shortages, and conflict in Mali’, 
Aljazeera.com, 27 April 2015.  
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rebellion began in January 2012, spurred by the return to Mali of Tua-
reg fighters who had been involved in Libya’s wars. With the fall of the 
Gadaffi regime, over 1500 heavily armed Tuareg fighters returned in 
convoys to the north of Mali. And these Tuareg were mobilised and 
more prepared for rebellion than in any previous era, including 
through the presence of a wing of young Tuareg and Arab intellectuals 
supporting independence, helping to transcend some of the divisions 
that have historically fractured the Tuareg.6   
Islamic extremist groups in the north of Mali comprise the other 
main trigger of the contemporary crisis in northern Mali. One of the 
main armed groups, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was a 
Salafist product of the Algerian civil war of 1991-2002. In response to 
its military losses in northern Algeria, one faction of AQIM withdrew to 
the extreme south of Algeria and further into the Malien Sahel. From 
here AQIM and its various affiliates and rivals sought not to conquer 
the Malian state, but to engage in smuggling and trafficking, aided by 
the negligence or active collusion of Malian officials linked to the re-
gime of former President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT), while seeking 
to extend their influence across the vast Sahelo-Saharan region from 
southeastern Algeria to Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to Lake Chad.7 
While certain Islamist groups in Mali such as Ansar ed-Dine are led by 
Tuareg and other northern Malians, AQIM’s leadership remains largely 
Algerian. More broadly, political and economic interests divide, on the 
one hand, the Algerian, Libyan and Moroccan Islamists who control the 
main Islamist katibas (‘battalions’), hold the most important positions, 
and profit the most from their control over the main smuggling and 
trafficking routes, and on the other hand, the sub-Saharan and 
Sahrahouis Islamists.8  
Unhappiness within the military with the government’s manage-
ment of the response to the rebellion, and especially its perceived ill-
equipping of military forces which were unable to effectively counter 
rebel assaults, resulted in a military coup in the south of the country by 
a group of mid-ranking officers on 22 March. The Tuareg separatist 
group MNLA, in a loose alliance with radical Islamists, moved swiftly to 
take advantage of the collapse of Mali’s military and by April had occu-
pied the northern part of the country, declaring the north to be the in-
dependent state of Azawad.  However the radical Islamic militant 
groups – Ansar ed-Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO – soon displaced the MNLA 
and, after consolidating control over most of the north, imposed a re-
gime of Sharia law across the north. 
                                                          
6  See discussion in Andy Morgan, ‘The Causes of the Tuareg Uprising of January 
2012: the Fourth Role of the Tamashek Dice’, Think Africa Press, February 2012. 
Available at: http://www.andymorganwrites.com/bko2kdl/ 
7  Emmanuel Grégoire, ‘Islamistes et rebelles touaregs maliens: alliances, rivalités et 
ruptures’, EchoGéo [Online], Sur le Vif, 3 July 2013, pp. 2-3.  
8  Grégoire, p. 3.  
  
 
Sub-regional and regional response: MICEMA and AFISMA 
The initial response to the crisis in Mali was a sub-regional one. The 
regional body ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 
responded quickly in condemning both the military coup that had over-
turned Mali’s constitutional order and the occupation of the north, but 
appeared to prioritize the former. A mediation process was begun un-
der the lead of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaoré. Applying 
travel and economic sanctions against the military junta at the begin-
ning of April 2012, ECOWAS asked neighbouring countries to close 
common border crossings with Mali and neighbouring seaports to all 
trade, a potentially devastating move given Mali’s dependence on for-
eign trade with its neighbours. It further froze transfers regional banks 
to Malian bank accounts, imposed travel bans and froze the assets of 
junta leaders unless the junta agreed to relinquish power and enable 
Mali’s return to constitutional order.9 On 6 April, with ECOWAS media-
tion, the junta leaders signed a framework agreement agreeing to a 
timetable for the restoration of constitutional order in exchange for 
amnesty for the junta members and the lifting of sanctions.10  
ECOWAS also declared that it was preparing its military force, the 
ECOWAS Mission in Mali or MICEMA, to send to Mali. However, the 
ECOWAS military response encountered more challenges, due to lack 
of capacities among member states, and opposition from Bamako as 
well as Algeria and Mauritania. One problem was that ECOWAS pre-
ferred a military response to the crisis, but political and military actors 
across the political spectrum in Mali rejected a deployment of ECOWAS 
forces.11 The junta opposed a mission that prioritized the return to con-
stitutional order in Mali. However other actors similarly raised objec-
tions to ECOWAS forces in Mali. In terms of neighbouring powers, nei-
ther the key regional actors Algeria or Mauritania are members of 
ECOWAS, nor did they support the idea of an ECOWAS military inter-
vention, due to concerns about the effect such an intervention would 
have in sending militants back over their borders.12 Pushing for an 
ECOWAS intervention without their support raised the risk of regional 
actors supporting different sides of the conflict.13 ECOWAS was also not 
                                                          
9 ‘ West African Ecowas leaders impose Mali sanctions’, BBC News Online, 3 April 
2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17591322 
10  ‘Mali sanctions lifted: ECOWAS’, Times Live Online, 8 April 2012, 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/africa/2012/04/08/mali-sanctions-lifted-ecowas 
11  Jean-Jacques Konadjé, ‘Quel role la Force en attente de la CEDEAO peut-elle jouer au 
Mali?’ 23 January 2013, http://www.operationspaix.net/83-dossier-du-rop-quel-
role-la-force-en-attente-de-la-cedeao-peut-elle-jouer-au-mali-.html, accessed 19 
April 2015 
12  Wolfram Lacher, ‘The Malian crisis and the challenge of regional security coopera-
tion’, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(2013), p. 3.  
13  Wolfram Lacher, ‘Northern Mali: Key is Strengthening Bamako; ECOWAS Plan Har-
bors Risks’, IPI Global “Observatory, 14 September 2012. 
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well suited to the early plans to retake northern cities from jihadist 
groups and the MNLA because ECOWAS does not have Algeria or Mau-
ritania as members, and bringing Algeria into any regional effort to 
address the Malian crisis was seen as essential.14 Various commenta-
tors also suggested that ECOWAS was not an appropriate body to assist 
with reform of the Malian armed forces, given that armies in certain 
francophone member states have carried out coups within recent 
memory, and appear to lack a firm ethos of military subordination to 
civilian rule.15 Ultimately, MICEMA did not develop beyond the plan-
ning stage, and was replaced by a wider AU initiative.  
The AU sought to assist in getting the regional force UN financial 
support, and by ‘continentalizing’ the framework for intervention, 
overcoming the reluctance of Algeria to support the response by ECO-
WAS.16 On 14 July, the AU’s Peace and Security Council formally re-
quested a strategic concept for the force. That same month ECOWAS 
sent a Technical Assessment Mission, which included AU and UN par-
ticipation, to Bamako to begin preparations for the deployment of the 
African-led International Support Mission to Mali, or AFISMA. AFISMA 
was to first help protect Mali’s transitional institutions and to strength-
en the capacity of Malian armed forces and, subsequently help the Ma-
lian army to restore state authority throughout the north. ECOWAS and 
the AU thus requested a mandate from the UN Security Council to de-
ploy the AFISMA stabilization force; however in July the UN Security 
Council withheld support, requesting more information about the ‘ob-
jectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment’ and ‘de-
tailed options’ for such a deployment.17  
A concrete response on AFISMA lagged while the threat posed to 
northern Mali by jihadist groups became more entrenched over 2012. A 
draft ‘Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali’ was 
only agreed on by the AU and ECOWAS on 24 October. It then was used 
to develop the draft ‘harmonized concept of operations’ for AFISMA. 
The concepts proposed that the main troop contributing countries 
(TCCs), Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Niger, would train, set up bases in 
the south, and then support the Malian army in its lead role of conduct-
ing combat operations to retake the north.18 According to Théroux-
Bénoni, putting Malian actors central in the intervention process was a 
                                                          
14  Lacher, ‘Northern Mali’.  
15  Lacher, ‘Northern Mali’.  
16  Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, ‘The Long Path to MINUSMA: Assessing the international 
response to the crisis in Mali’ in Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy (eds.), Peacekeeping 
in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture (Routledge, 2014), p. 175.  
17  United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056 (2012), S/Res/2056 (2012), para 
18.  
18  ‘West Africa bloc ECOWAS agrees to deploy troops to Mali’, BBC News, 11 Novem-
ber 2012. See also Théroux-Bénoni, p. 176.  
  
 
significant shift resulting from the AU’s involvement.19 It was also 
envisaged that AFISMA would only be fully operational by September 
2013. The UN Security Council however was reluctant to support a mil-
itary intervention under the operational concept presented by ECO-
WAS. Observers voiced skepticism that the proposed 3300 troops from 
15 West African states, along with the Malian army, had the necessary 
levels of professionalism to facilitate the retaking of northern Mali 
against battle-hardened armed groups accustomed to desert warfare.20 
Moreover troops of the proposed leader of the regional intervention, 
Nigeria, was noted to have stoked domestic popular sympathy and 
support for the insurgent group Boko Haram due to their reckless and 
abusive behaviour towards the civilian population.21 Nevertheless, in 
late December 2012 the UNSC unanimously approved SCR 2085 which 
authorised the deployment of an African-led International Support Mis-
sion to Mali (AFISMA) under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. However, the 
Security Council deferred for 30 days agreeing to provide AFISMA a 
voluntary and a UN-funded logistics support package, pending the re-
fining of options by ECOWAS and the AU, ‘including detailed recom-
mendations for a swift, transparent and effective implementation’.22  
However, on 10 January 2013 the Islamist group MUJAO captured 
Konna, a key strategic town in central Mali, from Malian forces, appear-
ing to signal the insurgency’s southward movement towards Bamako. 
Given the degraded state of the Malian army, and the lack of readiness 
of AFISMA to respond, the Malian interim government requested 
French assistance and a French-led military intervention ‘Serval’ was 
launched on 11 Jan 2013. The French and Chadian forces of Serval had 
by 18 January chased the jihadists from Konna and restored, at least 
nominally, Malian territorial sovereignty.  
From regional to international response: AFISMA and  
MINUSMA 
The French engagement in Mali was intended to be short and would 
require a rapid follow-on stabilization mission. ECOWAS and the AU 
began an accelerated deployment of AFISMA forces from Senegal, 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria to Mali beginning in January rather than the 
originally projected September, funded by voluntary contributions 
agreed at during an emergency donors meeting in Addis Ababa at the 
                                                          
19  héroux-Bénoni, p. 176.  
20  ‘Rice: French plan for Mali intervention is “crap”’, Foreign Policy Online, 11 Decem-
ber 2012.  
21  Anouar Boukhars, ‘What Next for Mali and Algeria?’, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 23 January 2013.  
22  United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012), 20 December 2012, para 
21.  
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end of January.23 Despite the contributions that AFISMA made with 
Serval to recovering northern Mali from the rebel and Islamist forces,24 
France put forward the suggestion that AFISMA be replaced by a robust 
UN mission, which would have the advantage of more secure funding 
than AFISMA, to handle the subsequent stabilisation of Mali. The no-
tion of re-hatting was endorsed by ECOWAS and the AU on 7 March 
2013, subject to several conditions, including consultation by the UN 
with the AU and ECOWAS on the appointment of the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General, with an expectation of ‘continuity’ 
in leadership of the mission and contingents.25 On 21 April 2013 the 
UN Security Council authorized the UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to replace AFISMA with a 
mandated strength of up to 11,200 military personnel and 1440 police 
personnel.26 The AU suggestions were ignored by the Security Council 
in authorizing and mandating MINUSMA, prompting a sharply-worded 
rebuke by the AU Peace and Security Council that it had not been ap-
propriately consulted in the drafting of the resolution for the takeover 
of AFISMA by MINUSMA.27 There was also resentment that AFISMA 
should have been provided with the logistical and financial means be-
fore the eventual re-hatting to the UN mission, and that there should 
have been greater continuity in military and civilian leadership from 
AFISMA to MINUSMA (i.e. military commander and head of mission 
positions).28 On 1 July 2013 AFISMA was replaced by MINUSMA with 
the re-hatting of some 6500 African peacekeepers.  
Despite multiple rounds of negotiations since 2014, a peace agree-
ment with the main northern Tuareg rebel groups has not yet been 
achieved, but is a necessary prerequisite to undertake governance and 
security sector reforms, and enable focusing the attention of interna-
tional and Malian security forces on combating jihadist and other ex-
tremist groups in the north. Clashes between members of the Coordina-
tion and Platform armed groups in the north has in the meantime in-
creased, linked by the UN to competition over control of strategic com-
                                                          
23  Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, ‘Disagreements over Mali could sour more 
than the upcoming African Union celebration’, IPI Global Observatory, 15 May 
2013.  
24  Festus Kofi Aubyn, ‘Policing and Peace Operations in Africa: Reflections on MI-
NUSMA’, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 39 (March 2015), p. 9.  
25  Communiqué of the 358th meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (AU) on the situation in Mali, 7 March 2013, para 13 (ii).  
26  United Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013), 25 April 2013.  
27  African Union Peace and Security Council, Communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. 
(CCCLXXI), 25 April 2013, para. 10.  
28  Cecilia Hull Wiklund and Gabriella Ingerstad, The Regionalisation of Peace Opera-
tions in Africa: Advantages, challenges and the way ahead, FOI-R-4031-SE, Febru-
ary 2015, p. 30.  
  
 
mercial and trafficking routes in the region.29 With the continuing fail-
ure to achieve a peace agreement between Bamako and the main armed 
opposition groups in the north, MINUSMA has been subject to repeated 
attacks by rebel and Islamist groups; due to the rate of casualties 
among its personnel, is considered the most deadly UN mission.30 
MINUSMA is operating in parallel with French forces that have a re-
gional (Sahelien) counterterrorism role through Operation Barkhane. 
MINUSMA also faces declining confidence among Malians, especially 
in the north. According to a public opinion poll conducted under the 
auspices of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, only 28% of northern Mali-
ans in Gao, Kidal and Ménaka held a positive view of MINUSMA.31 
The trajectory of the sub-regional and regional responses to the cri-
sis in Mali suggests several lessons about the impact and influence of 
regional actors. First, the responses of ECOWAS and the AU demon-
strated limitations of the African Peace and Security Architecture. 
While ECOWAS was initially quick to respond to Mali’s crisis, it was 
limited in what it could do due to its membership (which did not in-
clude the key state of Algeria, and to a lesser extent Mauritania) and its 
resources (lacking the capacities and funding to mount an intervention 
without external means of support). And yet, ECOWAS is considered 
‘first in class’ among the Regional Economic Communities/Regional 
Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) both in terms of preparing its brigades for the 
African Union’s Standby Force, which is supposed to be operational in 
2015, as well as due to the ECOWAS’ prior experience in conducting 
interventions in various crises that have affected the sub-region.  How-
ever, that experience and advanced capacities were not sufficient to 
provide a solution for the Mali crisis.32  
The African Union’s efforts to reframe the multilateral context for 
the African intervention from sub-regional to continental demonstrated 
how the AU could complement and collaborate with a REC in a conflict 
management initiative. However, AU-ECOWAS relations also suffered 
from lack of coordination and occasional tensions that delayed arriving 
at a consensus. The AU’s AFISMA plan also ran into similar challenges 
                                                          
29  UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 
S/2015/219, 27 March 2015, para. 16.  
30  Between 1 July 2013 and 1 May 2015, the mission has experienced 49 fatalities. 
MINUSMA Facts and Figures, 1 May 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/facts.shtml 
31  Mali-Mètre, ‘Enquête d’opinion “Que pensent les Maliens?”’, Numéro Spécial pour 
Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, janvier/février 2015, pp. 40-41. Can be accessed at: 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/mali/10100/ 
32  Jean-Jacques Konadjé, ‘Quel role la Force en attente de la CEDEAO peut-elle jouer au 
Mali?’ 23 January 2013, http://www.operationspaix.net/83-dossier-du-rop-quel-
role-la-force-en-attente-de-la-cedeao-peut-elle-jouer-au-mali-.html, accessed 19 
April 2015.  
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of capacity and funding that ECOWAS’ MICEMA had encountered, rely-
ing on the UN to provide financial and logistical support to sustain 
their planned deployments.33  
 
The need for regional solutions 
To what extent are the causes and consequences of instability regional-
ised? As discussed above, regional factors played a role in Mali’s crisis, 
strengthening Tuareg capacities and fostering an extremist Islamist 
presence in the north, further sustained by trade, smuggling and traf-
ficking networks. Wolfram Lacher asserts that the regional dimension 
to the Mali conflict is significant, but that it has been misunderstood as 
encompassing chiefly the Sahel region, when it should more accurately 
be seen as part of the Sahelo-Saharan region. However, broadening the 
regional perspective to include key North African states of Libya and 
Algeria is a much more challenging task than dealing with the weak, 
aid-dependent states of the Sahel. The task of devising regional solu-
tions is not made any easier by the historic rivalries and lack of trust 
among the key states of Algeria, Libya and Morocco.34  
Including Algeria in any solution for the Mali crisis is necessary, as 
indicated by its trade links with northern Mali, the influence of Algeri-
an salafists on the militant Islamic movement in Mali and elsewhere, 
Algerian (and Mauritanian) opposition to the planned ECOWAS mili-
tary intervention MICEMA, and Algeria’s role mediating between Bam-
ako and northern groups since the 1990s. However regional initiatives 
have been limited by regional rivalries, such as Algeria’s ‘pays du 
champ’ (core countries) initiative to counter criminal and extremist 
networks that involved Mauritania, Mali and Niger, but omitted Libya 
(which refused to join) and Morocco (which was excluded by Algiers); 
in the end the initiative failed to result in operational cooperation of the 
member countries.35  
Certain key Western initiatives have also adopted a circumscribed 
regional approach. For example, the EU’s 2011 Sahel strategy targeted 
the security-development nexus but was limited to Mauritania, Mali 
and Niger, even while recognising that similar challenges affected parts 
of the other Sahelien states of Burkina Faso and Chad, as well as 
neighbouring countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Nigeria, ‘whose 
engagement is necessary to help resolve them’, and that ‘developments 
in the Maghreb have consequences for the situation in the Sahel’.36 
                                                          
33  Théroux-Bénoni, pp. 176-177.  
34  Lacher, ‘The Malian crisis’, p. 3.  
35  Lacher, ‘The Malian crisis’, pp. 2-3.  
36  European Union External Action Service, ‘Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel’, 2011.  
  
 
Revised in 2014, the Strategy was formally extended to Chad and 
Burkina Faso, while political dialogue on conflict prevention and secu-
rity was to be pursued with West African and Maghreb neighbouring 
states.37  
Other organisations including ECOWAS, the AU, UN, World Bank 
and African Development Bank have each developed Sahel-specific 
strategies, but there is little or no harmonisation among them. These 
initiatives are also flawed by their predominant focus on military solu-
tions to countering terrorist groups and organised crime, as opposed to 
the governance and development deficits that drive radicalisation and 
conflict.38  
While smuggling, trafficking and hostage taking for ransom have 
been major sources of funding for militant Islamist groups activities, 
regional experts have argued that jihadism represented by AQIM and 
other extremist groups in the Maghreb states is fundamentally driven 
by poverty and the absence of viable livelihoods, and that smuggling 
and corruption thrive in part as a result of the dearth of intra-regional 
trade arrangements.39 Responses to the crisis in Mali must seek to ad-
dress not only the poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities that 
drive northern youth to militantism and smuggling, but given their 
intermingling with foreign armed groups and the wider political econ-
omy of smuggling and trafficking across the Sahelo-Saharan region, 
these must be seen as part of a complex regional system requiring inte-
grated and multidimensional regional responses.  
                                                          
37  Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on the Sahel Regional Action 
Plan 2015-2020’, Brussels, 20 April 2015, p. 10.  
38  Anouar Boukhars, ‘Rethinking Security Across the Sahara and the Sahel’, FRIDE 
Policy Brief No. 199 (April 2015), p. 5.  
39  Stephen Harmon, ‘From GSPC to AQIM: the evolution of an Algerian islamist terror-
ist group into an Al-Qu’ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel re-
gion’, Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin No. 85 (Spring 2010), p. 24.  
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